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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

81-4982

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August 20, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense


THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Presidential Guidelines on Taiwan Policy (S)

The new Taiwan guidelines (Tab A) submitted by Secretary Haig on 17 August 1981 have been approved by the President. (S)

The President has directed that a decision on advanced aircraft for Taiwan should be made no later than the end of this year. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

Tab A Haig memo of 31 July 81

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Review August 18, 1987


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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Subject: Taiwan Guidelines

Your initiatives toward China in the munitions control, economic, and legislative areas have given our bilateral relationship new momentum. They represent important steps in consolidating a vital strategic relationship and advancing your overall foreign policy goals.

I believe it is now time to deal with the Taiwan issue, to put our unofficial relations on a sounder footing that enables us to treat Taiwan with honor and dignity. This memo therefore updates my previous message to you on this subject and proposes a series of initiatives to improve our unofficial Taiwan relationship without damaging our strategic association with the PRC.

Our underlying goal must be to provide reassurance and restore trust. I recommend that we start this process by passing a comprehensive, authoritative message from you to President Chiang Ching-kuo, to be delivered jointly by appropriately high level State and White House personnel to Dr. Tsai Wei-ping, the head of Taiwan's CCNAA office here. The substance of this presentation would be an emphasis on things we can do, provided the Taiwan side will take into account our sensitivities and abide by some simple ground rules. The elements of this presentation are outlined below.

Treatment

We would assure Taiwan that:

-- Whenever high ranking officials visit the United States from Taiwan they will receive the same warm and courteous reception recently afforded Governor Yu Kuo-hua in May and Minister of Economic Affairs K. S. Chang in June 1981.

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-- Policy-level State Department officials will be prepared, whenever appropriate, to meet with CCNAA representatives, under American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) auspices, to ensure that any problems are swiftly addressed and to review periodically the full status of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

-- Through AIT, CCNAA personnel may arrange calls on working level officials (Office Director or below) at a number of U.S. departments whenever substantively necessary. Initial departments authorized to receive calls will be STR, the Eximbank, and the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture and Energy.

-- Later, depending on the absence of publicity, additional departments may be authorized to receive such calls.

-- For the time being, meetings with U.S. officials above the Office Director rank will be arranged by AIT, on request, outside government offices.

-- American personnel assigned to AIT Taipei will be authorized to call at Taiwan government offices handling commercial, economic, scientific and cultural affairs, provided this can be done without publicity.

-- As necessary, certain working level U.S. officials will be authorized to travel to Taiwan, as technical assistants to AIT, to provide assistance in air transport, textile, scientific and other negotiations.

New Offices

Despite specific sensitivities expressed by Deng, we would inform Taiwan that our current planning envisions the opening of a new CCNAA office in Boston, at the end of this year, on the understanding that no public announcement be made and that the Taiwan side refrain from background statements or other forms of indirect publicity. If all went well, additional offices would be considered, as needs arose, on a case-by-case basis.

Intelligence

We would make clear that possibilities for some expansion of intelligence support will be pursued.

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Arms Sales

In this most sensitive area, I propose that we reassure Taiwan that the U.S. will pay close attention to mainland capabilities and monitor carefully the military balance in the Strait, and, as needed to protect legitimate security interests, approve appropriate defensive arms for Taiwan. Specifically with regard to aircraft, we would assure Taiwan that replacements will be available for aircraft as they wear out, but no later than the end of 1982. We would also indicate our intention to begin acting upon pending requests for new sales to Taiwan, expressing our intention to approve requests for airport approach radars, search and rescue helicopters, standard missiles, and APCs. Assuming things went well, we would then be able to consider further weapons requests in 1982.

Implementation and Need for Confidentiality

You have already made clear that we will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, as called for by law. In order to be able to do so without creating unnecessary problems with Beijing, however, we will want to minimize -- or at least carefully manage -- publicity arising from such sales. To this end, we should phase our initiatives over the coming year and insist that the Taiwan side refrain from publicizing any of these measures.

Consequently, we would convey in your message to Dr. Tsai the absolute necessity of preserving the confidentiality of your communication and of the intended steps which it outlined. We would note that publicity about our new guidelines could put us in the unfortunate position of having to reassess and possibly alter our plans and timetable. We must proceed in good faith, and expect Taiwan to do the same.

In short, while some publicity concerning our approach to Taiwan will be inevitable and even politically desirable, the U.S. will need to keep as much control over the process as possible. For this we need a strong commitment from the Taiwan side to accept and honor our wish that they refrain from publicizing our initiatives, both now and as they are implemented.

Recommendation

That you approve this approach.

Approve

✓RR

Disapprove

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